Differentiation, self-selection and revenue management by Ng, Irene C. L.
 DIFFERENTIATION, SELF-SELECTION AND REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Irene C L Ng 1, Ph.D. 
 
Manuscript submitted to THE JOURNAL OF REVENUE AND PRICING 
MANAGEMENT 
July 21, 2005 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Dr. Irene C L Ng is with the School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter, U.K. She is 
also the Group Vice Chairman of SA Tours Group of Companies, a regional tour operator based 
in Malaysia, Singapore and China, as well as the Chairman of C L Ng & Associates (Malaysia and 
Hong Kong), a strategy consulting firm. 
 
Contact Information: School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, 
Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 1392 263250, Fax: +44 (0) 
1392 263242, Email: Irene.ng@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 2
DIFFERENTIATION, SELF-SELECTION AND REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper takes an interdisciplinary approach towards revenue management, 
incorporating economics and marketing concepts and proposing that firms employ a 
dynamic service differentiation so that consumer needs are met more closely. To locate 
market segments, the paper proposes that firms employ segmentation based on self-
selection, providing consumers with an array of choices that are truth revealing and 
allowing firms to price discriminate without the need to predetermine segments. Through 
differentiation and self selection, uncertainty could also be reduced. Furthermore, self 
selection could also allow firms to reduce the costs of coordinating and monitoring rate 
fences.  
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DIFFERENTIATION, SELF-SELECTION AND REVENUE MANAGEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
 Revenue management is the practice of obtaining the highest possible revenue in 
the selling of a service firm’s capacity. Essentially, buyers of a service purchase at 
different times before the consumption of the service. Hence, the firm would charge 
different prices according to buyers’ purchase times. Moreover, it is imperative that 
capacity sold to earlier (and perhaps lower paying) customers would not deprive the firm 
of obtaining higher revenue from customers arriving later. Consequently, firms would 
attempt to forecast demand and use tools such as targeted pricing and market 
segmentation to ensure the limited capacity of the firm attains the highest possible 
revenue. This practice is starting to find favor with many service firms that face relatively 
fixed capacity e.g. restaurants, hotels, cruise lines, electric power supply, and railways 
(Bitran and Caldentey, 2003). 
 In this paper, I provide an interdisciplinary approach towards revenue 
management, incorporating economics and marketing concepts and proposing that firms 
could take on a more proactive approach towards reducing uncertainty. I suggest that 
service firms could employ a dynamic service differentiation so that consumer needs are 
met more closely. However, differentiation is necessary but not sufficient to improve 
revenues. Firms must also be able to target the segments with differential pricing. Since 
consumer segments may not be easily discernible, firms could employ segmentation 
based on self-selection, providing consumers with an array of choices that are truth 
revealing and allowing firms to price discriminate without the need to predetermine market 
segments. Self selecting market segmentation could also allow firms to reduce the costs 
of coordinating and monitoring rate fences. Through a combination of differentiation and 
self selection, firms therefore have another option to reduce uncertainty instead of 
forecasting demand. 
 
MANAGING DEMAND VERSUS INFLUENCING DEMAND 
 One of the key principles of revenue management lies in the firm’s ability to 
forecast demand (Jauncey et al., 1995, Pak and Piersma, 2002, Kimes, 1999, 2003). 
Revenue management systems must be able to advise on demand conditions by 
analyzing reservation patterns, arrival, departures and a score of other demand 
characteristics (Jauncey et al., 1995, Donaghy et al., 1995, 1997).  Recent literature has 
suggested that revenue management systems with demand forecasting algorithms are 
increasingly expensive to implement, both in real terms and in lost opportunities 
(Anderson and Blair, 2004, Desiraju and Shugan, 1999). A typical system costs between 
USD$1 million to $3 million and takes more than two years to implement (Lahoti, 2002). 
Moreover, research has suggested that these complex and sophisticated revenue 
management systems are not infallible. With demand forecasts using the data of the past 
and sales departments using present day information, conflicts often occur (Ng et al., 
1999) and many revenue management systems operate with some level of human 
intervention, often using these systems as a guide. 
 Demand forecasting may not be very effective for four reasons. First, demand 
characteristics, upon which revenue management studies are premised, should be based 
on fundamental concepts of consumer behavior (cf. Chase, 1999; Lieberman, 1993; 
 4
Relihan, 1989; Boyd, 2004; Desiraju and Shugan, 1999).  Within a historical pattern of 
demand, why consumers behave the way they do are just as important as how they are 
behaving (Ng, 2004). Consequently, mere observation of the past may not be a good 
indicator of the future, as Cary (2004) has also noted. Second, demand forecasting, at its 
best, is still an aggregation of multiple segments that could, if possible, be desegregated 
for higher revenue. Third, past demand profiles are subject to many factors, not least the 
actions and pricing strategies of the competitors at that time, and the firm’s own reaction 
to them. To assume that demand based on historical data can still hold for the future 
could be assuming too much. Finally, demand can be influenced, not merely be known. 
As early as 1951, Schumpeter said that wants cannot be taken as independent and 
consumers could be taught by producers to want new things, "or things which differ in 
some respect or other from those which they have been in the habit of using" 
(Schumpeter, 1951; Liebhafsky, 1968).  
 
DYNAMIC SERVICE DIFFERENTIATION 
Indeed, firms have been attempting to influence demand since the beginning of 
trade, through product differentiation. Smith (1956) described product differentiation as 
a way to alter the shape of the price-quantity demand curve facing the firm. 
Differentiation was investigated by various early economics researchers, notably 
Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1965). Hotelling showed how firms choose their 
‘locations’ in the product space so as to buffer themselves from direct price competition. 
Chamberlin proposed that consumer perceptions of similar products differ, and whether 
the perceptions are real or imagined, such preferences led to different demand curves 
and could be a basis of firms’ attempts to differentiate between their products and those 
of the competitor. Porter (1976), who popularized the notion of product differentiation, 
elaborated on the practice further, demonstrating that greater revenues can be obtained 
from differentiation as it increases cross-price inelasticities with respect to competing 
products. Since then, much of the benefits of product differentiation has been extolled 
and studied by numerous researchers in both economics and marketing streams.  
At the heart of a product differentiation strategy lays consumer value. Firms are 
able to increase revenue from introducing differentiated products primarily because 
these products can be distinguished from their rivals on attributes that are “meaningful, 
relevant and valuable” to consumers (Carpenter et. al., 1994, p 339). However, the 
concept of value for services is usually more complex. This is because for some 
services such as a flight or a night’s stay at a hotel, the consumption of a service, 
commonly labeled as the service experience, lasts a meaningful length of time 
(Lovelock and Wirtz, 2003) and is subjected to various influences. Consequently, the 
value attained by the consumer is multi-attribute, incorporating both the core service 
(e.g. one night’s sleep) as well as the supplementary services (e.g. check-in, facilities 
etc.). Indeed, service literature has long acknowledged that consumers of services often 
are willing to pay for service augmentation such as supplemental services that 
complement and facilitate the core service (Shostack, 1981; Storey and Easingwood, 
1998). Lovelock and Wirtz (2003) classified supplemental services into eight categories 
of information, payment, billing, consultation, order-taking, hospitality, safekeeping and 
exceptions.  
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With an augmented service experience that is multi-attribute in nature, it is 
therefore logical to conceive that a heterogeneous market of consumers would value 
such attributes differently and would be willing to pay different prices according to the 
different levels of service attained e.g. business class vs economy class. 
As many service firms operate with high fixed and low marginal costs, certain 
aspects of the augmented service can therefore be varied without much increase in 
costs e.g. different channels of payment, in-room check-in etc. Yet, simple variations in 
service delivery can sometimes lead to higher willingness to pay by consumers, e.g. 
consumers may be willing to pay higher prices if they don’t have to wait. 
The point of this discussion is that while it has been acknowledged that 
differentiation is able to influence demand, the practice of differentiation is traditionally 
viewed as one that is both strategic and static. The firm decides on the attributes that 
are important to consumers, produces the product according to what has been 
specified, and prices according to the (differentiated) demand that unfolds. This is 
because changing attributes to influence demand dynamically for goods may be too 
costly or impossible to achieve. Clearly, this may not be true for services. Consequently, 
the service consumer’s willingness-to-pay could be influenced through the firm’s 
manipulation of its augmented service attributes, since marginal costs may be low in 
producing different variations of the service and the corresponding marginal increase in 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay is high. With current technological advances, such 
service differentiation practices are becoming increasingly easy and dynamic 
(Prabhaker et. al, 1995; Kannan and Kopalle, 2001). Accordingly, selling on the internet 
may be effective not only because it is a low cost channel for firms (cf. Boyd, 2004) but 
also because it lowers the effort costs of consumers, who may be willing to pay higher 
for purchases through the internet.  
 In fact, the very act of requiring consumers to be present in the consumption of a 
service would already guarantee that the service consumed is a differentiated one. It is 
widely recognized that services are inconsistently produced (heterogeneous). Hence, it is 
logical that the consumption of the same service by two customers will be perceived 
differently, even without the firm’s effort to differentiate. In addition, by having to show up 
to consume, the price heterogeneous consumers pay for a service is not the only cost 
borne by them. Non-monetary costs (such as effort) expended by the consumer during 
both purchase and consumption influences the consumer’s valuation of the service 
(Lovelock and Wirtz, 2003). Hence, even if all consumers buy at the same price, the final 
‘price’ paid is different across consumers since they have different time and effort costs.  
 Moreover, services are experiential products, and often a simple change can alter 
the value perceptions of consumers. Hence, when services are able to change its 
attributes relatively easy, assisted by technology, customization strategies result in the 
firm’s ability to dynamically (and almost instantly) modify its service offering in response to 
the consumers’ demands. For example, consumers may be willing to purchase a ticket at 
a higher price if the ticket can be made more flexible in terms of the time of travel (‘open’ 
ticket). Yet the marginal cost of providing flexibility (i.e. differentiation) could be lower than 
the marginal increase in revenue due to a higher valuation by the consumer. In other 
words, firms have another avenue to improve revenues i.e. changing consumers’ 
perception of value so that a higher price can be obtained.  
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SELF SELECTION AND DYNAMIC MARKET SEGMENTATION 
 Merely being able to differentiate does not entitle a firm to higher revenues. To do 
so, the firm must be able to segment based on its differentiating efforts and target the 
segments to obtain discriminating prices. How, then does a firm know how to segment 
consumers and how is the firm to know which consumer segments have a preference for 
what type of attributes?  
This question is also a crucial one in revenue management as one of the pre-
requisites of revenue management practice is the ability to segment the market 
(Weatherford and Bodily, 1992; Upchurch et al., 2002; Kimes, 1989; Lieberman, 1993; 
Schwartz, 1998). Only when the market can be segmented could it be targeted with 
different prices. Yet, much of the consumer market today is unpredictable. Merely 20 
years ago, certain behaviors were often positively correlated with certain lifestyles, 
ages, income or even geographical location. In other words, the young behaved young, 
the old behaved old, people with money spent more, families had a father and mother 
and so on. Today, the old act young and vice versa, people with less money tend to 
spend more (as credit card debts attest to), and many families have only one parent. 
With globalization, even cultural behaviors and lifestyle attributes are becoming more 
complex. As a popular saying goes, “you know you are in a changing world when the 
top rap artist is Caucasian, the top golfer is African-American and the French call the 
US arrogant2. Faced with such changing times, traditional segmentation through 
geographic, demographic and even some psycho-graphic approaches are proving to be 
less effective in predicting purchasing behavior. Even when sophisticated data-sensitive 
software is used, many market segmentation schemes are not very successful (Neal 
and Wurst, 2001). It seems ironic that in a world where so much information can be 
obtained, marketers are becoming less able to understand their customers.  
Increasingly, firms lean towards the practice of benefit segmentation (cf. 
Weinstein, 1987). Benefit segmentation is widely acknowledged as one of the best ways 
to segment markets as it divides a heterogeneous population into relatively 
homogeneous groups on the basis of product or service benefits consumers perceive 
as important (Chang and Chen, 1995). 
Yet, when consumers are less predictable, so would their valuation of the 
attributes within a service. Hence, even when employing benefit segmentation, firms are 
still left trying to predict which groups of consumers would benefit from which types of 
service attributes. Consequently, it may not be commercially prudent to tailor a service 
towards only pre-determined segments. In this respect, a menu of services with flexible 
attributes allows the market to self select. This idea of segmentation through self-
selection was originated from the economics concept of a ‘designed contract’ for 
compensating an agent who possesses more information than the agent who offers the 
contract. By choosing a contract the agent with more information reveals the truth about 
her/his preference. In marketing, this ‘designed contract’ can be deemed to be a 
produce-price pair and the product-price line as an array of contracts offered by the firm 
who does not know the identity of the consumers in her/his market (Moorthy, 1984). 
From the array, consumers choose to buy different pairs, thus revealing what they truly 
                                                 
2 Adapted from www.ezboard.com discussion board posting 
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value. This concept was proposed by the Nobel Laureates of Economics (2001) i.e. 
Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Spence (1973) as asymmetric 
information and developed for market segmentation purposes by Moorthy (1984). In 
application to revenue management it is therefore clear that service choices (i.e. a 
service that is differentiated on several dimensions), if cleverly designed, are able to 
separate markets to the degree that traditional segmentation approaches could never 
have achieved.  
Furthermore, traditional revenue management tends to rely on market 
segmentation practices that may not be efficient, resulting in cannibalization between 
segments. ‘Rate fences’, as it is commonly known in revenue management literature 
becomes more common to reduce such cannibalization. Yet, erecting such fences may 
result in perceived unfairness (Kimes and Wirtz, 2002; Kimes, 1994). Furthermore, such 
segmentation efforts would result in increased monitoring and coordinating costs. By 
adopting an approach of changing the attributes of a service, or providing a menu of 
service attribute choices, consumers would self-select as all product/service choices are 
accessible to all segments.  
In the earlier example, a simple matter of changing a fixed time ticket to allow 
flexible consumption times immediately reduces the risk of not being able to consume a 
service as buyers are not constrained on when they are allowed to travel. Since the 
choice of ideal travel time is known only to the individual (and therefore is private 
information because it is not known to the firm) different degrees of flexibility at different 
prices allow consumers to self select, and this could help to increase revenues. In other 
words, by tweaking service attributes, the firm can better meet the needs of different 
consumers.  
All this means that although the ability to segment is a necessary element to be 
able to practice revenue management, the segmentation does not have to be performed 
by the firm. With an increasing amount of data available about customers, firms could 
provide a menu of choices that could be less costly than the traditional costs of 
targeting, coordinating and erecting rate fences.  
How does a firm design products that could result in segmentation through self-
selection? Three principles need to be followed. First, there must be sufficient incentives 
within each product for market segments to separate on their own. This means that the 
attributes that differentiate between segments must be clear. This could be obtained 
through various means e.g. a conjoint analysis of the market where preferences and 
trade offs between one attribute and another can be discerned. Second, for two different 
segments to choose different products, care must be taken such that it is not in the 
interest of either segment to mimic the behavior of the other segment. For example, in a 
ski resort, vacationers may know that they could get a lower price of a grocery product if 
they were to get a local newspaper and cut out a coupon, but may not be willing to do 
so because it requires effort and they are already willing to pay higher prices. Locals, 
however, would still continue to enjoy lower prices in this manner. In this way, the firm is 
able to obtain more optimal revenue instead of having to choose which segment to 
target. Finally, the array of products presented must be in such a way that each 
consumer’s choice is truth revealing. Consumers choosing one product over another 
inform the firm which segment they belong to. 
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The benefit of such a policy extends beyond the cost savings the firm would 
enjoy. When consumers self select, they also enable the firm to price discriminate and 
obtain higher revenues. The Robinson-Patman Act (U.S.) specifies that a firm cannot 
deny a segment access to what is being offered to another segment, unless legally 
allowed to do so. Through self-selection, all product choices are available to all 
segments, yet each segment willingly pays a different price because they have no 
interest in mimicking the other segment.  
 Set against this backdrop, it is easy to see the implicit assumptions of demand 
forecasting. Demand forecasting views the product/service as static, and would aim to 
predict customers’ arrival times. The firm sets prices and capacity allocations based on 
such forecasted patterns of demand so that capacity allocated to earlier (and perhaps 
lower paying) customers would not deprive the firm of obtaining higher revenue from 
customers arriving later. However, my thesis here is that neither price changing nor 
capacity allocating are the limits of revenue management. As discussed previously, while 
goods’ attributes are far more difficult to change, many service attributes can be changed 
easily and dynamically because such services can be purchased and consumed by a 
customer in many different ways. Hence, a more satisfying approach may lie in creating a 
dynamic system where service attributes could be changed to suit individual segments. 
By differentiating on a service through technology, mass market becomes more 
fragmented and segmentable which allows the firm to practice mass customization and 
targeted pricing to derive higher price discriminating revenues. As Talluri and van Ryzin 
(2004) proposed, consumer demand is dependent on the controls being applied by the 
seller. Yet, these controls are not limited to price. Service attributes in themselves could 
be subjected to change, and in doing so, demand may be influenced.  
For example, a key uncertainty in revenue management is having to forecast for 
‘late arrivals’ since this segment is willing to pay a higher price and therefore potentially 
increase revenues. Rather than forecasting and waiting for buyers to arrive, the firm 
could allow a flexible flight time (e.g. open tickets) which could in turn persuade the late 
arrival market to buy earlier as well as pay higher, reducing uncertainty for both the firm 
and the buyer (buyers could also suffer the uncertainty of not having the service as 
capacity could have been sold out if they decide to buy too late). Clearly this is a rather 
simplistic example. However, my point is that revenue managers, instead of merely 
observing patterns of historical demand, need to understand the antecedents of such 
demand so that service attributes can be dynamically varied to meet segment needs at 
more precise levels. In the words of Prabhaker et al. (1995), “at the aggregate level, 
therefore, the hit rate improves as market uncertainty, measured as the distance 
between customers’ needs and their perceptions of product value, decreases.” 
This implies that within revenue management at least, conventional demand 
forecasting is not the only tool to the reduce uncertainty. With the possibility of 
differentiation without the usual costs associated with it, dynamic service differentiation 
can be a strategy to reduce uncertainty by pro-actively influencing the distribution of 
demand through varying its service attributes. Finally, since the firm now has another 
option to manage uncertainty, it should weigh the cost of installing demand forecasting 
systems against the cost of allowing more dynamic changes in service attributes. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
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 In this paper, I propose two strategies to assist firms in improving revenues and 
reducing uncertainty, dynamic service differentiation and self selection. Through dynamic 
service differentiation, service attributes are changed dynamically according to the 
preferences of consumers, thereby influencing demand and its distribution. This is in 
contrast to demand forecasting, a practice in revenue management that assumes a static 
product/service. To discern consumer preferences, the paper proposes self-selection 
segmentation, whereby all product choices are accessible to all segments, yet each 
segment willingly pays a different price because they have no interest in mimicking the 
other segment. By allowing the market to self select, the firm is able to be more precise in 
segmentation and therefore derive higher revenues. In addition, a self selection strategy 
could reduce monitoring and coordinating rate fences.  
In this information age it is an accepted belief that the success and survival of 
companies and even individuals are dependent on their ability to “locate and analyze 
and use information skillfully and appropriately” (Hubbard, 1987). In this respect, 
information attained by the firm has a dual role. On one hand, it helps the firm seek out 
customers location (even in the spatial sense), to communicate, promote or sell to them. 
On the other hand, the firm must also be prepared to look inwards by modifying the 
service, bundle and construct choices. In so doing, the function of revenue management 
would be one of improvement and enhancement of revenues, instead of merely 
managing them. 
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